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Ediberto Roman*
I. INTRODUCTION
From tabloids to treatises, it is almost commonplace today for one to
learn about the exploits of attorneys who have "saved" their clients'
cases. We frequently read how an attorney's closing argument success-
fully marshalled the evidence and persuaded the jury to accept his or
her client's position.' Equally significant, but much less frequently ad-
dressed, is the potentially devastating impact that an attorney's factual
statements concerning his or her client's case can have on the outcome
of that case. An attorney's role in litigation necessarily includes making
* The author is a litigation associate at Haythe & Curley and former lecturer at
Herbert H. Lehman College. The author would like to thank Michael J. Leahy and
John R. Armstrong, Creighton University School of law classes of 1995 and 1996,
respectively, for their assistance and encouragement, and a special thanks to John J.
Sullivan, Esq. of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, for his constructive comments and advice
with regards to this article and countless other legal matters over the years.
1. David Zemen, Several Trials Have Held Nation Transfixed Over Past 100
Years, DET. FREE PRESS, Sept. 26, 1994, at IA (relating how noted attorney Clarence
Darrow convinced a jury in the notorious Leopold and Loeb murder case that, al-
though guilty, his clients had suffered enough); Verdict Against Terrorism, WASH.
POST, Mar. 5, 1994, at A18 (discussing how prosecutors successfully pieced together
forensic and circumstantial evidence in the World Trade Center bombing case to get
a conviction despite the lack of eyewitnesses or confessions).
factual assertions concerning his or her clients' case. These factual
assertions, however, are sometimes incorrect or inconsistent with their
clients' previously asserted position. It is neither unusual nor imprudent
for opposing counsel to take advantage of such statements, known as
admissions. The impact of these admissions on the outcome of the case
varies greatly, depending on when, where, and how the admission was
made.
Imagine an attorney, in an action to enforce a loan guaranty, admit-
ting in an answer that his or her client signed the guaranty despite the
fact that the client did not actually do so.2 The trial court in turn grants
the opposing party's motion for summary judgment based upon the
admission in the answer.' Such were the facts in Missouri Housing
Development Commission v. Brice,4 where the government brought an
action to enforce a guaranty of a loan." The answer, which was the
response of several defendants, admitted that they signed the guaran-
ty.' The government then moved for summary judgment.7 While the
motion was pending, one defendant denied signing the guaranty in his
answers to the government's request for admissions, interrogatories,
and during his deposition.8 Despite this fact, the district court granted
the motion for summary judgment? On appeal, defendant's counsel ar-
gued that the admission in the answer was invalid for two reasons.
First, the admission had been rebutted by other evidence. Second, the
government waived the right to rely on the answer by asking the defen-
dant whether he signed the guaranty during discovery." Despite this
argument, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling and bound the defendant to his admission in the an-
swer."
The Brice decision is only one example of how an attorney's inadver-
tent or mistaken admission, in addition to potentially causing serious
client relations problems, can have a tremendous impact on the out-
2. See infra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
4. 919 F.2d 1306 (8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Brice].
5. Id. at 1308.
6. Id. (this loan was made in connection with the lease of a nursing home).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1314.
11. Id. at 1315.
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come of a case. 2 This result can occur despite having an abundance of
evidence to disprove the factually incorrect statement.
3
The theory behind using admissions made by an attorney against his
or her client rests upon the legal doctrine that any statement made by a
party can subsequently be used against that party.4 Courts have not
questioned the theory that counsel, while not the actual party, speaks
for and as the party, particularly in litigation. 5 However, not all
attorneys' factual admissions are deemed binding or consequential to
the case. Courts vary greatly on the significance given to attorneys'
factual statements. Courts have the discretion to: (1) bind the attorney's
client to the statement and .remove the factual issue from the case;6
(2) admit the statement into evidence as an evidentiary admission;7 or
(3) not use the statement for any purpose. 8
12. See, e.g., Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934) ("the exercise
of [power to direct a verdict based upon a judicial admission] in a proper case is
not only not objectionable, but is convenient in saving time and expense by shorten-
ing trials").
13. Jones v. Morehead, 68 U.S. 155, 165 (1835) (holding that despite evidence to
the contrary, a client is bound by his counsel's statements); Brice, 919 F.2d at 1314
(stating a party is bound to its admission despite later producing evidence contrary
to those admissions); Davis v. A.G. Edwards and Sons, Inc., 823 F.2d 105, 106 (5th
Cir. 1987) (holding that despite affidavit conflicting with complaint, the client is
bound to admission in complaint).
14. 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1058, at 26 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1972) [hereinafter 4 WIGMORE] (stating the rule that statements by an opponent may
be admissible against him); JOHN W. STRONG ET AL, 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 254,
at 447-49 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCORMICK] (summarizing rule and various views
of its applicability).
15. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (a statement is not hearsay if it is "the party's own state-
ment in either an individual or representative capacity"); MCCORMICK, supra note 14
§ 244, at 520; 2 JONES, EVIDENCE § 358, at 673 (5th ed. 1958 & Supp. 1971) ("Dur-
ing ... trial attorneys stand in the place of their clients and may perform acts
which the client might perform in person. Hence there is scarcely any limit to the
admissions which they may make."); Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Serv. Inc., 263 F.2d
948, 953 (5th Cir. 1959) ("an attorney has wide authority in the conduct of litigation.
He is chosen to speak for the client in court. When he speaks in court, whether it
be on a formal trial or in an informal pretrial, he speaks for and as the client.");
Kungig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 32 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir.) (holding
that a statement by counsel in a pleading is a statement made for and by counsel's
client), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 579 (1929).
16. See infra notes 80-93.
17. See ibfura notes 60-79.
18. See infra notes 55-57.
The following three scenarios illustrate this discretion. First, if an
attorney makes an incorrect statement in a pleading such as a com-
plaint or an answer, the court will almost always treat the statement as
a judicial admission.'9 A judicial admission concedes a fact, removing
that fact from any further possible dispute. It also obviates any need for
the opposing party to prove the fact admitted.' Second, if an attorney
makes the same factual statement in open court, it will likely be treated
as a judicial admission as long as the statement was clear and unambig-
uous.2 If the admission is instead made in other documents submitted
to a court, in particular a memorandum of law, the court, despite hav-
ing the power to treat the statement as a judicial admission, will not
likely treat the statement as such.'
This article analyzes the law regarding party admissions; specifically
as applied to statements in pleadings, open court, and memoranda of
law. In particular, this article will: (1) provide a detailed description of
the two types of admissions counsel make; (2) address courts' treat-
ment of attorneys' admissions in different circumstances; and (3) pro-
vide an argument for treating attorneys' admissions in memoranda of
law similar to admissions in open court or in pleadings. The goal of this
article is to provide a blueprint of the law on admissions, an area of
law where all to often counsel pays little attention, and to advocate a
change in the treatment of attorneys' admissions in memoranda of law.
Courts have failed to adequately articulate why statements made in
open court, which are often spontaneous and not well thought out,
should be treated as judicial admissions, whereas statements made in
memoranda of law, which are typically well thought out and deliberate,
should not be treated as such.' Courts justify the difference in the
treatment of these statements by noting that statements in memoranda
of law are not part of the official record.' While this may be true,
courts have not hesitated to hold attorneys accountable for statements
19. See, e.g., Best Canvas Products & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713
F.2d 618, 621 (l1th Cir. 1983) ("A party is bound by the admissions in his
pleadings.").
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., In re Eagson Corp., 37 B.R. 471, 482 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) ("If un-
equivocal and made within the scope of his authority, statements made by an attor-
ney . . . are . . . binding upon the attorney's client."); United States v. Benton, 947
F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that closing statement constituted judicial admis-
sion); United States v. Wilmer, 779 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1986) (attorney's statement
during oral argument was judicial admission).
22. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536, 544 (5th Cir. 1990)
(refusing to conclude that there was a judicial admission stemming from counsel's
statement which the court described as patently inaccurate).
23. See infra notes 106-25, 126-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
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made and positions taken in documents not part of the record under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the doctrine of judicial estoppel.
By treating attorneys' statements in memoranda of law as judicial
admissions, efficiencies in the judicial process would be created and
greater guidance would be provided to the bar and judiciary. For in-
stance, consistent application of the judicial admission doctrine to
statements in memoranda of law will force attorneys to be more cau-
tious when presenting their client's version of the facts, especially when
counsel is considering making overly aggressive factual arguments in
motions and supporting memoranda of law. As Professor Wigmore ar-
gued:
The doctrine of Judicial Admissions has long had a large future before it, if judges
would but use it adequately. In the first place, the judge could apply it to all in-
formal, as well as formal, admissions by counsel during trial .... It is easy to see
how large a mass of needless sdrmishing can thereby be eliminated, how much
time would be saved, and how much confusion of the jury would be avoided. And
this would be attained by the mere application of an existing principle."
II. ADMISSIONS: JUDICIAL VERSUS EVIDENTIARY
An admission is a statement made by a party that can subsequently be
used in a trial against that party.26 Any statement made by a party re-
gardless of when, where or how made, can be used against that party.
Both the common law and, more recently, the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize that a factual statement made by an attorney can be used as
an admission of the party that the attorney represents.27
There are two types of factual admissions that an attorney can make:
(1) judicial admissions (also known as stipulated facts)' and (2)
evidentiary' (or quasi-judicial) admissions.' Below is a detailed de-
scription of these two types of admissions and their significant differenc-
es.
25. 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2597, at 852 (1981 & Supp. 1991)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter 9 WIGMORE].
26. See supra note 14.
27. See supra note 14-15 and accompanying text.
28. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 254; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2588, at 821.
29. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 254, at 142.
30. Although Professor Wigmore uses the term "quasi-judicial" admission, most
courts and this Article use the term "evidentiary admission." See, e.g., White v.
Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983).
A. Judicial Admissions
A judicial admission has been described as "a formal act, done in the
course of judicial proceedings, which waives or dispenses with the pro-
duction of evidence, by conceding for the purposes of litigation that the
proposition of fact alleged by the opponent is true."" In fact, admissions
are not actually evidence,' but "formal concessions in the pleadings in
the case or stipulations' by a party or its counsel that have the effect of
withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for
proof of the fact."' In other words, a fact that is judicially admitted is
no longer a fact at issue in the case-the party making the judicial ad-
mission has conceded to it.'
Federal courts have not wavered in describing this doctrine.' The
Eighth Circuit held that a judicial admission "acts as a substitute for
evidence in that it does away with the need for evidence in regard to the
subject matter of the judicial admission."37 Similarly, the Eleventh and
Fifth Circuits have held that "judicial admissions are proof possessing
the highest possible probative value. Indeed, facts judicially admitted are
facts established not only beyond the need of evidence to prove them,
but beyond the power of evidence to controvert them."' In sum, a judi-
31. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 14 § 1058, at 27.
32. MCCORMICK, supra note 14 § 254, at 449.
33. Despite the above quoted language, judicial admissions are found in documents
other than a pleading or stipulation. See, e.g., Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 595 n.13 (7th Cir. 1977), vacated by, 435 U.S. 992 (1978) (treating
a statement in a brief as a judicial admission).
34. McCormick, supra note 14, § 254, at 449.
35. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2590, at 822-23. Significant distinctions exist be-
tween the theory of judicial admissions and the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel, like a
judicial admission, has the effect of concluding any dispute concerning a fact. Unlike
a judicial admission, however, "estoppel is an obligation made by a rule of substan-
tive law," which typically "requires some additional act of detriment to the obligee."
Id. at 822. The doctrine of judicial estoppel, sometimes known as the doctrine of
preclusion of inconsistent statements, prevents a party from asserting a position con-
trary to an earlier successful position in another proceeding. In other words, under
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, where a party assumes a certain position in a legal
proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not, simply because his
interests have changed, take a contrary position in a subsequent case. See Patriot
Cinemas, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 211-15 (1st Cir. 1987); 1 JOHN
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcCE § 8.3[9], at 106-07 (1994).
36. Whether courts have wavered in the application of the doctrine is the thrust of
this Article, and it is asserted that they have.
37. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir.
1968).
38. Best Canvas Prod. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618,
621 (lth Cir. 1983) (quoting Hill v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 124 F.2d 104, 106 (5th
Cir. 1941)).
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cial admission conclusively concedes the truth of a fact alleged and re-
lieves the opposing party of the need to introduce any further evidence
on the admitted fact.'
Although courts do not differ in describing the judicial admission doc-
trine, they have disagreed on its usefulness. Some courts have opined
that judicial admissions play the important role of achieving "just,
speedy, and inexpensive determinations."40 Other authorities have ex-
pressed skepticism about the use of judicial admissions due, in part, to
the potential severe impact they can have on a claim.4
Typically, judicial admissions arise from statements made by a party's
counsel. ' "Judicial admissions commonly appear by way of stipulations,
pleadings, statements in pretrial orders, and responses to requests for ad-
missions."" Often, however, they are the product of mistake or inadver-
tence rather than conscious decisions to finalize a contested issue." In
fact, judicial admissions can arise from an "involuntary act" of a party. '
Courts have held that "any" clear and unequivocal' statement, either writ-
ten' or oral," made in the course of judicial proceedings qualifies as a
judicial admission."' However, there is authority for the proposition
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934) ("the exercise
of the power [to direct verdict based upon a judicial admission] in a proper case is
not only not objectionable, but is convenient in saving time and expense by shorten-
ing trials"); Prestwood v. Watson, 20 So. 600, 600 (Ala. 1896) ("Agreements of this
character, intelligently and deliberately made,-whether made by the parties . . . or
by their attorneys ... are encouraged and favored. Their purpose, generally is to
save costs and to expedite trials . . . ").
41. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 22, § 2591, at 824; see Pietsch v. Pietsch, 92 N.E. 325,
326 (Il. 1910) (mocking the idea that a judge could decide a case based on the
opening statements alone).
42. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2594, at 832-33.
43. In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253, 258 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989); see also Best Canvas
Prod. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618, 621 (lth Cir. 1983).
44. See Note, Judicial Admissions, 64 COLUM. L REV. 1121, 1121 (1964).
45. See United States v. Belculfine, 527 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1975) ("a judicial
admission can arise from an 'involuntary' act of a party"); Best v. District of Colum-
bia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934) ("[tlhere is no question as to the power of the trial
court to direct a verdict for the defendant upon the opening statement of plaintiffs
counsel where that statement establishes that the plaintiff has no right to recover").
46. In re Lafkas Gen. Partner No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804, 807 (Bankr. N.D. IlI. 1993)
(citing Ensiqn v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913)).
47. Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1959) (party bound by
counsel's opening statement).
48. See Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1097-99 (10th Cir. 1991) (affir-
that judicial admissions should rarely result from inadvertent statements
made by an attorney.49 Nonetheless, it appears from the case law that
judicial admissions arise from any purposeful or inadvertent statement of
counsel and occur at any stage of litigation, including pleadings, discov-
ery, pre-trial agreements,' and statements made in open court.5
While there has been debate as to the usefulness of judicial admissions
in all circumstances, there is little question that they can have a substan-
tial impact on the outcome of a matter. For instance, a judicial admission
may (1) prove a fact that could not otherwise be proven by competent
evidence;' (2) prevent the introduction of damaging evidence;' and (3)
even create a fact that is otherwise nonexistent.' Thus, depending upon
what is admitted, judicial admissions can easily determine or at least
greatly influence the outcome of a case. Largely because of the poten-
tially devastating impact of judicial admissions, trial courts have the dis-
cretion to accept or reject treating a statement as a judicial admission.'
mative, formal factual statements stipulated to in a first trial constituted a judicial
admission binding on the party at retrial).
49. See, e.g., Belcu~fine, 527 F.2d at 944 (arguing that "considerations of fairness
dictate that [the] class of 'involuntary' admissions be narrow"); Stockton v. Tester,
273 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) ("Normally .... [a judicial admission] is an
act or statement formally and deliberately made or done, as distinguished from an
unintentional or quasi-admission"); accord New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323
F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963) (judicial admissions "serve a highly useful purpose in
dispensing with proof of formal matters and of facts about which there is no real
dispute"), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964); Prestwood v. Watson, 20 So. 600, 600
(Ala. 1896) (judicial admissions are useful in that they dispense with uncontroverted
facts).
50. See supra note 4246 and accompanying text.
51. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1880) (counsel's opening statement
binding on client); Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (treating a
statement in a closing argument as a judicial admission).
52. See Thompson v. Fort Worth & R.G. Ry. Co., 73 S.W. 29, 29-30 (Tex. Ct. App.
1903) (admitting hearsay by stipulation).
53. Judicial Admissions, supra note 44, at 1122; accord Fuentes v. Tucker, 187
P.2d 752, 755 (Cal. 1947) (holding that the trial court was incorrect in permitting evi-
dence regarding circumstance surrounding deaths after defendant admitted liability for
wrongful deaths).
54. See Jones v. Morehead, 68 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1863) (stating that despite there
being no evidence of infringement, defendants were bound by an answer which stat-
ed that they used plaintiffs design).
55. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2590 (1981); see, e.g., In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253,
259 (1989) (stating "the conclusive effect of a judicial admission, the policies under-
lying modem liberal rules of pleading and the alternative . . . to be used as evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 801 are all factors that coalesce to warrant a reluc-
tance to base the imposition of a judicial admission on an inadvertent statement");
United States v. Belculfme, 527 F.2d 941, 943 (1st Cir. 1975) ("considerations of fair-
ness dictate that [the] class of 'involuntary' admissions be narrow"). For additional
examples of the courts' discretion see L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Wm. Wrigley, Jr., Co.,
[Vol. 22: 981, 1995] Judicial Admissions
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While the doctrine of judicial admissions may apply to "any fact whatev-
er," courts have exercised their discretion to not be bound to a stipu-
lated fact when the fact stipulated may be characterized as an "ultimate"
fact.' Notwithstanding their discretion, courts have judicially admitted a
wide variety of facts including those that may be considered ultimate.5 7
In light of a trial court's discretion to accept or reject treating a factual
statement as a judicial admission, it is all the more peculiar that courts
as a general matter do not hesitate to treat statements made in pleadings
or in open court as judicial admissions, but are unwilling to recognize
statements made in memoranda of law as judicial admissions.
While judicial admissions concede facts, courts have generally rejected
stipulations as to matters of law.' In certain instances, however, parties
may stipulate as to the governing law (unless such agreements are
deemed contrary to public policy).' For instance, parties may stipulate
253 F. 914 (7th Cir. 1918); McCarthy v. Kepreta, 139 N.W. 992 (N.D. 1913); State v.
Nebraska St. Sav. Bank, 259 N.W. 46 (Neb. 1935); Morton v. Central Nat'l Bank, 43
P.2d 394 (Okia. 1935); Steinberg v. Merchants Bank, 67 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1933).
56. See, e.g., Platt v. United States, 163 F.2d 165, 168 (10th Cir. 1947) (stating
"parties may not stipulate the findings of fact upon which conclusions of law and the
judgment of the court are to be based").
57. See, e.g., H. Hackfield & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442 (1905) (stating
"[w]e think the parties were entitled to have this case tried upon the assumption that
these ultimate facts, stipulated to in the record, were established"); Jones v.
Morehead, 68 U.S. 155, 164 (1863) (binding client in an infringement action to answer
admitting use of the plaintiffs methods).
58. See, e.g., Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1949) (stating "our judg-
ments are precedents, and proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left
merely to the stipulation of parties"); Swift & Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry., 243 U.S.
281, 289-90 (1916) ('If the stipulation is to be treated as an agreement concerning the
legal effect of admitted facts, it is obviously inoperative; since the court cannot be
controlled by agreement of counsel on a subsidiary question of law."); New Amster-
dam Cas. Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963) (stating "[the doctrine of
judicial admissions has never been applied to counsel's statement of his conception
of the legal theory of the case"), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964); Clark v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 1981- Trade Cas. (CCH) par. 63,903 (N.D. Mo. 1980). See generally Judicial
Admissions, supra note 44, at 1124. Nevertheless, as is discussed below, counsel who
switch arguments may suffer certain consequences.
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (stating "the law
of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual right and duties will be
applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could have resolved by an ex-
plicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue"); Reighley v. Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 61 N.E.2d 29 (Ill. 1945) (stating that parties may stipulate to
governing law as long as the agreement is not contrary to public policy).
In civil matters, however, parties can admit liability, leaving only damages to be
that the law of a particular jurisdiction applies for the interpretation of a
contract.3
B. Evidentiary Admissions
It is one of the most well known and often repeated tenets of law that
an out-of-court statement offered for its truth is hearsay and is not ad-
missible in court."1 Nevertheless, evidentiary admissions, which are ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule, are statements made by a party or its agent,
regardless of whether it is made out of court or in court, typically used
to contradict or otherwise impeach the party's current assertion.' Evi-
dentiary admissions can also assist in proving the truth of the matter
asserted, depending on the circumstances surrounding the making of the
statement. They are exempted from the definition of hearsay under the
Federal Rules on the theory that their admissibility into evidence is the
result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions
of the hearsay rule. This is because the foundation of evidentiary ad-
missions rests upon the trustworthiness of the information sought to be
admitted, and the belief that party admissions, unlike other exceptions to
the hearsay rule, contain guarantees of trustworthiness.'
It is now well accepted that statements made by an attorney during
the course of litigation, whether oral or written, are presumed to be
authorized by the client, and thus constitute admissions by that party.'
determined.
60. Reighley, 61 N.E.2d at 32.
61. See infra notes 63-64.
62. FED. R. EVID. 801(d); see, e.g., United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 324 (6th
Cir. 1988) (stating an admission must only be adverse to the defendant's position at
trial); Gaspard & Co. v. Guam, 427 F.2d 276, 278 (9th Cir. 1970) (stating "a decla-
ration by a litigant contrary to his position in the lawsuit is admissible under an
exception to the hearsay rule as an admission"). See generally JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)[01], at 801-232-33, 801-250-51
(1993) [hereinafter WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE].
63. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 801-43; John S. Strahorn, A Reconsid-
eration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 84 U. PA. L. REV. 484, 564 (1937); 4
WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 1048; MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE § 265
(1967).
64. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 62, at 801-43. This commentator also argues
that evidentiary admissions need no such guarantees of trustworthiness.
65. McCORMICK, supra note 14, at 163; see United States v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d
1253, 1259 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding "statements made by an attorney concerning a
matter within his employment may be admissible against the party retaining the attor-
ney") (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983)); United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169, 173-74 (2d Cir.
.1987) (stating in a criminal case "[the] trial judge must be accorded considerable
discretion [in] determining the application of Rule 801(d)(2) to statements of an attor-
ney offered by [a] prosecutor" against defendant); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp.,
[Vol. 22: 981, 19951 Judicial Admissions
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In fact, Rules 801(d)(2)(B),(C), and (D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provide that any relevant statement made by a party or his agent acting
in the scope of his employment, which is offered against that party, is
generally admissible into evidence as an evidentiary admission.'
Rule 801(d)(2) provides in pertinent part:
(d) A statement is not hearsay if-
(2) The statement is offered against a party and is...
(B) [A] statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief
in its truth, or
(C) [A] statement by a person authorized by the party to make a state-
ment concerning the subject, or
(D) [A] statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the exis-
tence of the relationship.67
The Advisory Committee Note provides that subsection (B) codifies
traditional principles of adoptive admissions.' The Advisory Committee
Note explains that subsection (C) is intended to encompass statements
made by agents or employees to third parties. Subsection (C) in essence
codifies the traditional view that a declarant's statements are admissible
if the declarant is authorized by the party to speak on behalf of the par-
ty.' The Advisory Committee Note suggests that subsection (D) was
790 F.2d 552, 555-56 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating "[i]t is the general rule that 'statements
made by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible
against the party retaining the attorney'") (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 662
F.2d 131, 142 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983)), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
992 (1986); United States v. Martin, 773 F.2d 579, 583 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding state-
ments made by attorney to an IRS auditor at the pretrial stage was admissible); Unit-
ed States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 27-34 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding an opening statement
made by an attorney is admissible in a later lawsuit against his client); In re AOV
Indus. Inc., 62 B.R. 968, 977 (D.C. 1986) (holding a statement by an attorney in a
letter was an admission of his client); United States v. D.KG. Appaloosas, Inc., 630
F. Supp. 1540, 1564 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (stating the general rule that "statements made
by an attorney concerning any matter within the scope of his employment are admis-
sible" against his client, but "[g]overnment attorneys in criminal cases are exempt
from this rule since they supposedly are uninterested in the outcome of the trial"),
afffd, 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988).
66. FED. R. EVID. 801(d); see also United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130 (1st
Cir. 1988) (discussing Federal rule of Evidence 801); Comment, Vicarious Admis-
sions, The Admissibility Against His Principal of an Agent's Extra-Judicial State-
ment, 10 KAN. L. REV. 74 (1961) (discussing the admissibility of vicarious admissions).
67. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B), (C) and (D).
68. FED. R. EVID. 801(d) Advisory Committee's notes.
69. Id.
intended to embody the results from recent cases which permitted state-
ments of agents or employees made in the scope of their employment to
be received as evidence against their principals or employers."
Counsels' statements to a third party, such as the court, fall squarely
within both subsections (C) and (D). If the lawyer makes the statements
to the third party in the presence of his client, they may also be consid-
ered admissions by adoption under subsection (B)."
Unlike judicial admissions, evidentiary admissions are merely consid-
ered another item in evidence and are not binding or conclusive on the
trier of fact.' Like any other evidence, evidentiary admissions are sub-
ject to contradiction or explanation.' Thus, the classification of a state-
ment as either an evidentiary or a judicial admission has a tremendous
impact on the way an issue is treated because "[a]n evidentiary admis-
sion is an item in the mass of evidence that the jury can consider, while
a judicial admission is a waiver, relieving the opposing party from the
need of any evidence that the statement is true."' This difference in
how a court classifies the admission, as either judicial or evidentiary,
may in some circumstances decide the case. For instance, in a real estate
action, where the statute of frauds presumably applies, if plaintiffs coun-
sel incorrectly states that the contract was oral, the court may bind the
plaintiff to his or her counsel's statement and dismiss the case for failure
to satisfy the statute of frauds."
In light of the potential effect of attorneys' admissions, judicial or evi-
dentiary, counsel should take great care when asserting facts on behalf
of their clients, because counsel speaks "for and as the client."7" Coun-
sel should also be ready to recognize and capitalize on admissions made
by adversaries.' There is little comfort in the assumption that a client
will "pipe up" if his trial lawyer misspeaks at any point during a trial.m
"[L]itigants are usually so unfamiliar with courtroom procedure (or their
attorney's strategy) that they are in no position to correct factual
errors."79
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2590, at 823.
73. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 254, at 142; Aide v. Taylor, 7 N.W.2d 757, 759
(1943).
74. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 259, at 142.
75. According to the Supreme Court, dismissal of a case under such circumstances
does not impose an unjust penalty on the plaintiff who voluntarily selected counsel.
Link v. Wabash RR. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962).
76. Laird v. Air Carrier Engine Service, Inc., 263 F.2d 948, 953 (5th Cir. 1959); see
also FED. R. EVID. 801 (d) (discussing impact of agent's admissions).
77. Mansfield, Lawyers' Admissions, 12 LITIG. 39 (1978).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Ill. JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
A. Pleadings
The now well recognized view that a statement made by an attorney
may be used against the attorney's client was stated by the Supreme
Court over 100 years ago.' In Jones v. Morehead, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that statements admitted by the defendants in an answer
were binding despite the fact that no evidence of the truth of the matter
was introduced in the case, and the Court itself did not believe the state-
ments to be true."' Jones' holding is widely accepted and the prevailing
view on the issue of admissions by party opponents can be summarized
as follows:
A party may at any and all times invoke the language of his opponent's pleading
on that particular issue as rendering certain facts indisputable; and... in doing
this, he is on the one hand neither required nor allowed to offer the pleading in
evidence in the ordinary manner, nor on the other hand forbidden to comment in
argument without having made a formal offer....
This quote also illustrates that a statement in an unamended or super-
seded pleading may be used as a judicial admission in the action where
the pleading was filed.' Judicial admissions, however, are not found
80. Jones v. Morehead, 68 U.S. 155 (1864) (holding that it would be inequitable
and against sound judgment to allow attorneys to retract statements admitted in an-
swers); see also DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 459-60 (3d ed. 1991) (examining
vicarious admission doctrine).
81. Jones involved a patent infringement action concerning the mechanisms of
plaintiffs lock. Although Justice Field concluded that "in point of fact, the defendants
have not infringed [plaintiffs] patent," the court bound defendants to the statements
in their answer that they did make locks as described in plaintiffs patent. Jones, 68
U.S. at 164.
82. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 1064, at 67. Admissions in pleadings can not only
be used as judicial admissions, they can also be used to impeach. Professor
McCormick recognizes that statements in pleadings are generally considered judicial
admissions, but points out that if a party desires to use an averment or admission in
his adversary's pleadings to prove the existence of some subordinate fact, courts will
allow the statement in the pleading to be read or submitted into the record. See, e.g.,
MCCORmICK, supra note 14, § 265; see also Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1251 (10th
Cir. 1980) (reasoning that "Itihe factual matter contained in the pleadings is admissi-
ble as an admission by a party made by his agent acting within the scope of his
employment" and that such evidence is "admissible for substantive purpose, and need
not be received solely for impeachment purposes"); Frederic P. Wiedersum Assoc. v.
National Homes Constr. Corp., 540 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that evidence of
inconsistencies between the complaint and trial testimony regarding a crucial date
was erroneously withheld from the jury).
83. See, e.g., Missouri Housing Dev. Comm'n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306, 1314 (8th Cir.
where the statements are ambiguous "assuming arguendo" comments by
counsel, or when the statements are made upon inconsistent pleas.' Un-
1990) (holding that "'admissions in the pleadings ... are in the nature of judicial
admissions binding upon the parties'"); Ahqhazali v. Secretary of Health & Human
Services, 867 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that stipulations and admissions made
by a party in their answer are binding judicial admissions); American Title Ins. Co. v.
Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988), criticized by Brice, 919 F.2d 1306 (8th
Cir. 1990), and superseded by statute as stated in Setco Enters., Corp. v. Robbins, 19
F.3d 1278 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that "statements of fact contained in a brief may
be considered admissions of the party in the discretion of the district court"); White
v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, (5th Cir. 1983), criticized by Brice, 919 F.2d
1306 (8th Cir. 1990), and superseded by statute as stated in Setco Enters., Corp. v.
Robbins, 19 F.3d 1278 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant employer waived argu-
ment that employee's admissions were conclusive because it failed to argue such
position); Best Canvas Prods. & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618
(11th Cir. 1983) (denying buyer of truck tarpaulins' motion to amend product liability
complaint, holding that buyer was bound by its admissions as to where the cause of
action arose and what choice of law applied); Giannone v. United States Steel Corp.,
238 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1956) (holding that admissions in a third party com-
plaint/counterclaim are binding, but legal conclusions are not admissions and cannot
be reasonably interpreted as factual admissions); Hill v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 124
F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1941) (holding that candy manufacturer's admissions of material
allegations in its answer to Federal Trade Commission's complaint was equivalent to
waiver of a further hearing as to such facts); Darling Shops v. Brack, 95 F.2d 135
(8th Cir. 1938) (holding that admissions in a party's answer may be considered
against that party regardless of the fact that they were not offered in evidence at
trial unless the answer is amended or withdrawn); Pullman Co. v. Bullard, 44 F.2d
347 (5th Cir. 1930) (clarifying that admissions contained in pleadings that are amend-
ed or withdrawn may still be introduced by opposing party, but are subject to con-
tradiction or explanation); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyreisen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 32
F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1929) (affirming that amended or withdrawn pleadings cease to be
conclusive judicial admissions but they remain as controvertible evidence of stated
facts), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 579 (1929); Gile v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 405
F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (holding that defendant insurer's admission in its an-
swer that exhibit in plaintiffs complaint was a true and correct copy of the insur-
ance policy precluded insurer from subsequently arguing that exhibit did not accu-
rately represent the policy); Judicial Admissions, supra note 44 (positing that
"[p]leadings, according to most courts and commentators, constitute an important
device for effectuating judicial admissions").
84. Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1215 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing
simultaneous inconsistent claims in same action where there was no evidence of
"intentional self-contradiction"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1197 (1985); Schneider v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 842-43 (D.C. Cir. 1981), (ruling that defendant's
comments as to plaintiffs condition, made before his examination, were considered
.assuming arguendo" comments and not admissions); Continental Ins. Co. v. Sherman,
439 F.2d 1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1971) (explaining that inconsistent pleadings under Fed-
eral Rule 8(e)(2) should be interpreted as allegations negating each other, and that
such a rule should preclude interpretation of a cross claim that is inconsistent with
that party's defense as an admission); New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Waller, 323
F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963) (holding that counsel's statements regarding the legal theo-
ries of the case do not work as a forfeiture of the party's legal rights), cert. denied,
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like the treatment of statements made in open court, the decisions ad-
dressing statements in pleadings do not focus on the requirement that
the statements be "clear and unequivocal."' If the incorrect statement is
in a complaint,' an answer, 7 a counterclaim,' or a request for a bill
of particulars,' the statement removes the issue from the trier of fact
and is deemed true.' Courts have likewise treated factual assertions in
pretrial orders as judicial admissions.9' By definition, statements made
in a request to admit are judicial admissions.' Statements made in stipu-
lations are also treated as judicial admissions.'
B. Counsels' Statements In Pleadings Can Be Transformed Into
Evidentiary Admissions
If a statement in an unamended pleading action is considered a judicial
admission, and that pleading is amended or withdrawn, the admission is
typically transformed from a judicial into an evidentiary one.' As Pro-
fessor Wigmore explains:
When a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion disappears
from the record as a judicial admission limiting the issues and putting certain
facts beyond dispute. Nevertheless, [the amended or superseded pleading] exists
as an utterance once deliberately made by the party. While thus denied all further
effect as a pleading, may it not still be used as a quasi admission, like any other
utterance of the party."
376 U.S. 963 (1964); In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that
counsel's statements as to client's property equity in bankruptcy court proceedings
did not equate to admission as to the value of such property).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983).
87. Hill v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 124 F.2d 104, 106 (C.C.A. 1941).
88. Best Canvas Products & Supplies, Inc. v. Ploof Truck Lines, Inc., 713 F.2d 618,
621 (11th Cir. 1983)
89. United States v. G.A.F. Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1258 (2d Cir. 1991) (admitting
amended bill of particulars under Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2)).
90. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
91. See Mull v. Ford Motor Co., 368 F.2d 713, 715 (2d Cir. 1966) (addressing pre-
trial orders); White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 (5th Cir. 1983) (dis-
cussing pretrial orders and pleadings).
92. See In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253, 253 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989).
93. American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988); Holiday
Inns, Inc. v. Alberding, 683 F.2d 931, 935 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that, in a dispute
over "defendant's profits," a party was bound by its pretrial agreement stipulating its
profits as "a defendant").
94. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 14 § 1067, at 88.
95. Id. at § 1067, at 88. As with any other purported evidentiary admission, a trial
Courts have also treated amended or superseded pleadings as eviden-
tiary admissions in subsequent litigation involving the party.' However,
when a statement or plea from another case is sought to be used in a
second suit, courts are "careful to allow the opposing party (the
declarant's party) a full opportunity to explain the admission to demon-
strate that there is an issue of material fact."' Professor McCormick,
while acknowledging that his theory is "not widely recognized," opines
that a possible exception to the use of pleadings as admissions arises
when a pleading is amended, withdrawn, or superseded.' He feels that
these statements should not be considered party admissions because to
admit them into evidence contravenes the policy of liberality in amend-
ments.'
court has the discretion to exclude the admission of the prior inconsistent pleading if
the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence would outweigh its probative value.
See Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., Inc., 874 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1989).
96. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1984) ("The law is quite
clear that [superseded] pleadings constitute the admissions of a party-opponent and
are admissible in the case in which they were originally filed as well as in any sub-
sequent litigation involving that party."); see also Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc., 915
F.2d 1428, 1431 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[inconsistent allegations contained in prior
pleadings are admissible [as evidentiary admissions] in subsequent litigation."); Hardy
v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 851 F.2d 742, 745 (5th Cir.) ("[Tihere is a well estab-
lished rule that factual allegations in the trial court pleadings of a party in one case
may be admissible in a different case as evidentiary admissions of that party."), rehg
denied, 860 F.2d 1437 (1988); Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 556 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that pleadings from a prior case may be used for impeachment
purposes under F.R.E. 613, or as substantive evidence under F.R.E. 801 (d) (2)), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986); Enquip, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corp., 655 F.2d 115, 118
(7th Cir. 1981) ("It is well established in this circuit and elsewhere that [a pleading]
from one proceeding is indeed admissible and cognizable in another . . . furthermore,
the trial court properly ruled that while such evidence was admissible it was not a
judicial admission and thus not binding or conclusive.") (emphasis added); Ross v.
Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 15 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[A]n admission in a pleading in
one action may be received in evidence against the pleader on the trial of another
action to which he is a party."); Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d 432, 437 (10th
Cir. 1956) (recognizing that prior pleading was an evidentiary admission and rejecting
defendant's claim the prior pleading operated as an "estoppel" or was conclusive);
MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 257 ("A party's pleading in one case may generally be
used as an evidentiary admission in other litigation."); 4 WIGMORE, supra note 14, at
§ 1066 (discussing prior pleadings in other causes of action); accord Contractor Utili-
ty Sales Co. v. Certain-Teed Products, 638 F.2d 1061, 1084 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Although
prior pleadings cease to be conclusive judicial admissions, they are admissible in a
civil action as evidentiary admissions.").
97. Enquip, Inc. v. Smith-McDonald Corp., 655 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1981).
98. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, § 257.
99. Id.; see also Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156 (8th Cir. 1981); MURRAY, CALIFOR-
NiA EVIDENCE § 7.07.
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In a similar vein, courts under certain circumstances have refused to
treat amended or withdrawn pleadings as even evidentiary admis-
sions." A number of courts have held that amended or withdrawn
pleadings will not necessarily be admitted as evidentiary admissions if
the admission in the pleading would contravene the policy and intention
behind the liberal pleading provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(e)(2)."°' For instance, in a complicated joinder situation involving a
claim and answer, a third-party claim and answer, and a third-party
cross-claim which was later amended, the amended cross-claim may be
introduced into evidence by the original defendant against the third-party
defendant in order to point out the inconsistency between the allegations
of the third-party answer and the cross-claim. In such a situation, the
Fifth Circuit"°2 reiterated the basic rule of evidentiary admissions, but
stated that:
Strictly applied, however, this rule would place a litigant at his peril in exercising
the liberal pleading and joinder provisions of the Federal Rules of Procedure in
that inconsistent pleadings under Rule 8(e)(2) could be used, in the proper cir-
cumstances, as admissions negating each other and the allegations in third-party
complaints and cross-claims seeking recovery over in the event of liability in the
principal action could be used in that action as admissions establishing liability.
Thus as a necessary exception to the general rule, there is ample authority that
one of two inconsistent pleas cannot be used as evidence in the trial of the oth-
er. 10
Another exception to treating amended or superseded pleadings as
evidentiary admissions, in at least one jurisdiction, arises where the
100. Similarly, statements made by the government in a bill of particulars from a
prior prosecution could be admitted as evidence in a subsequent trial. United States
v. GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991).
101. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sherman, 439 F.2d 1294 (5th Cir.
1971).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1298; see also Garman, 666 F.2d at 1159 (adopting Sherman's view on
inconsistent pleadings and stating "to allow [inconsistent pleadings] to operate as
admissions would frustrate their underlying purpose."); OKI America, Inc. v. Microtech
Int'l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1989) (adopting Sherman); Nichols v. Barwick,
792 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir. 1986) (stating that the general rule of judicial admis-
sions does not apply when the defendant takes inconsistent positions in its pleadings
"in order to lay a basis for establishing the contingent liability of [the plaintiff and
third party defendant]"); Giannone v. U.S. Steel Corp., 238 F.2d 544, 547 n. 4 (3d Cir.
1956) ("[Aluthorities generally concede that one of two inconsistent pleas cannot be
used as evidence in the tial of the other"). But see Vincent v. Louis Mark & Co.,
874 F.2d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 1989) (using a balancing approach under Fed. R. Evid. 403
for determining the admissibility of prior inconsistent pleadings).
amendment to the pleadings only adds allegations, deleting nothing stat-
ed in the original pleadings."a This type of admission, made in a prior
pleading, continued to have conclusive effect."
C. Statements in Open Court
The Supreme Court has long recognized the binding effect of counsels'
statements made in open court. Over one hundred years ago in
Oscanyan v. Arms Co.,"° Justice Field, writing the opinion for the ma-
jority, found that the plaintiff in an action to recover sales commissions
was bound by an admission of his counsel during counsel's opening
statement.' 7 Counsel's statement in Oscanyan, in effect, admitted that
the contract in question was against public policy." The Supreme
Court reasoned that:
In the trial of a cause the admissions of counsel, as to matters to be proved, are
constantly received and acted upon. They may dispense with proof of facts for
which witnesses would otherwise be called. They may limit the demand made or
the set-off claimed. Indeed, any fact, bearing upon the issues involved, admitted
by counsel, may be the ground of the court's procedure equally as if established
by the clearest proof."
The Court further determined that there were no unguarded expres-
sions used, nor any ambiguous statements made, and that counsel was
fully apprised of all the facts underlying his client's claim.10 Since the
decision in Oscanyan in 1880, federal courts have conclusively bound
parties to statements made by their attorneys during trial."' The Second
Circuit recently applied Oscanyan and noted that "the general adnissibil-
104. See White v. Arco/Polymers, Inc., 720 F.2d 1391, 1396 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing that where the amendment to the pleadings only adds allegations, deleting nothing
stated in the original pleadings, admissions made in the prior pleadings continue to
have conclusive effect).
105. Id.
106. 103 U.S. 261 (1880).
107. Id. at 263-66.
108. Id. at 262-63. In plaintiffs opening, counsel stated that plaintiffs sales were
made while he was an officer of the Turkish government, and the sale was accom-
plished through the influence he exerted upon the government's agent. Defendant
then moved for a directed verdict which was granted.
109. Id. at 263.
110. Id. at 264.
111. See, e.g., Collins v. Texas Co., 267 F.2d 257, 258 (5th Cir. 1959) (citing
Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 261) (in action for damage to submerged oyster beds caused
by defendant in undertaking to exploit mineral leases, plaintiff was bound by admis-
sion in opening that defendant had a lease from state to explore for oil in area)
(citation omitted); Dick v. United States, 40 F.2d 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1930) (statement
of defendant's counsel in opening statement that there was no controversy about
defendant's previous conviction for selling liquor held admission binding on defen-
dant); cf. Roades, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 340 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1965).
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ity of an attorney's statement, as well as the binding effect of an opening
statement within the four corners of a single trial, are thus well estab-
lished."
Examples of how an attorney can bind his client by statements during
a trial are numerous. In one situation, an attorney for his defendant cli-
ent stated in closing argument that the plaintiff likely experienced some
discomfort after the car accident in question."' The court found that
this statement was an admission that plaintiff suffered injuries. 4 In an-
other decision, a bank's attorney, during the course of a hearing, judi-
cially bound his client by stating that the debtor's obligation to the bank
was non-interest-bearing."5 Similarly, the Third Circuit held that defense
counsel's acceptance at trial of the authenticity of certain exhibits consti-
tuted a binding judicial admission."' Even an attorney's statement made
at the bench has been deemed a judicial admission. 7
Another court recently acknowledged the propriety of applying the
judicial admission doctrine to statements made in open court, but ap-
plied it in a questionable fashion. In Jacobs Manufacturing Co. v. Sam
Brown Co.,' the court initially noted that counsel's statement waived
an issue from the case, but then stated that counsel's subsequent actions
raised a doubt as to whether the statement was unambiguous."' The
court first held that the statement was an admission but that the admis-
sion was somehow eliminated or reversed by subsequent action on the
part of the attorney. The Jacobs decision is unsettling because a state-
ment made during the course of a trial, if clear and unequivocal when
made, is a judicial admission. By holding otherwise, all judicial admis-
sions could be vitiated by subsequent corrections, a procedure not recog-
nized under the judicial admission doctrine.'2" Statements that were am-
112. United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1984).
113. Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 291-92 (E.D. Pa. 1983). While counsel's
blunders can severely harm a party's claims, clients are not typically without recourse
against their attorneys. For instance, a party may sue its counsel for malpractice.
114. Id.
115. In re Eagson Corp., 37 B.R. 471, 480 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (the statement significant-
ly reduced the bank's potential recovery).
116. Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1972).
117. United States v. Cravero, 530 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1976) (during a bench confer-
ence defense counsel conceded that a witness committed perjury).
118. 792 F. Supp. 1520 (W.D. Mo. 1992), offd in part, rev'd in part, 19 F.3d 1259
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 487 (1994).
119. Id. at 1531-32.
120. See, e.g., Missouri Hous. Dev. Comm'n v. Brice, 919 F.2d 1306, 1314 (8th Cir.
biguous when made are more defensible as not being admissions when
evidence of that fact is demonstrated by counsel's subsequent actions.
However, if one cannot conclude that the statement was ambiguous
when made, then an admission, is "an admission, is an admis-
sion .... 121
Although the application of the judicial admission doctrine to state-
ments made in open court dates back to the early days of American
jurisprudence, and are prolific in number the more recent decisions ad-
dressing this issue do not typically go unnoticed."n Indeed, some schol-
ars have called for a more widespread and consistent use of judicial
admissions." Greater application of the doctrine of judicial admissions
for statements made by attorneys is seen as accomplishing several goals.
It will aid the bar, the judiciary,, and possibly litigants by forcing attor-
neys to be accountable for their actions and statements in court. While
some might attack the greater use of the doctrine, as inequitable if ap-
plied in all circumstances, it should be remembered that trial courts have
the discretion to avoid the consequences of a judicial admission.' 2A
Courts may assess the ramifications and specific consequences of deem-
ing the statement a party admission and simply choose to ignore the
statement. If, however, courts would address admissions by attorneys
1990) (holding that the production of contradictory evidence would not allow a party
to avoid the impact of the general rule rendering admissions binding); New Amster-
dam Casualty Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963) (stating that once a judi-
cial admission has been made, subject matter ought not to be reopened in absence
of showing of exceptional circumstances); Jones v. Morehead, 68 U.S. 155, 165 (1863)
("an effort has been made by counsel to show that this admission has been waived,
by the act of plaintiffs .... It would be subversive of all sound practice, and tend
largely to defeat the ends of justice, if the court should refuse to accept a fact as
settled").
121. See supra notes 46-51, 84. Another exception to the judicial admission doctrine
occurs where counsel's statement was made under a degree of compulsion, outside
the presence of his client, and the information sought was an element of a potential
criminal charge. See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975).
122. See Alan Mansfield, Lawyers' Admissions, 12 LITIG. 39 (1978) (warning the bar,
in light of McKeon, of the potentially damning effect of opening statements).
123. Id.; see Judicial Admissions, supra note 44, at 1132 (1964) (judicial admissions
considered binding on parties in many different situations); Freida F. Bein, Parties'
Admissions, Agents' Admission: Hearsay Wolves in Sheep's Clothing, 12 HOFS'rRA L
REv. 393 (1984) (analyzing different theoretical justifications for admissions);
9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2597 at 852.
124. See supra notes 55-57; see also L.P. Larson, Jr., Co. v. Win. Wrigley, Jr., Co.,
253 F. 914, 917 (7th Cir.) ("[Ujndoubtedly a litigant has no cause for complaint if the
Court accepts his solemn and sworn admissions in pleadings and testimony as true.
But we must reject the contention that his adversary has the right to compel the
court to do so."), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 580 (1918).
The issue relating to the viability, usefulness and potential harm of the judicial
admission doctrine suggests that further analysis would be useful.
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more consistently and in all forms of court documents and statements,
counsel would be aware that they, along with their clients, will be held
accountable for imprudent, overly-aggressive or untruthful factual posi-
tions taken in documents such as memoranda of law.
As will be discussed further, more consistent and frequent use of the
doctrine would also strengthen standards of professionalism and ac-
countability within the bar, assist in achieving quicker resolutions of
issues, and avoid the consequences of haphazard application of the law.
For instance, when the doctrine is thus used, the likelihood of the ap-
pearance of non-judicial motivations behind the decisions would be di-
minished.25
D. Memoranda of Law
Despite the fact that judges have the discretion to avoid recognizing
admissions," courts have repeatedly recognized the binding effect of
statements by counsel in pleadings. '27 Courts have also conclusively
bound parties for statements made by their counsel in open court.'"
With memoranda of law, however, courts have been inconsistent in their
discretion to treat these statements as binding judicial admissions.
The difficulty federal courts have had dealing with counsels' factual
statements in memoranda of law is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
handling of the issue. In United States v. Fruehauf," the Supreme
Court alluded to, but chose not to address, whether an admission in a
memorandum of law should be treated as a judicial admission." The
appellant in Fruehauf was indicted for unlawfully delivering money to a
125. See, e.g., United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1984). This deals
with an extremely sensitive political issue involving allegations of arms smuggling for
terrorists. During the trial there were numerous allegations that the United States
government officials sympathetic to the Irish Republican Army were leaking informa-
tion to defense counsel. After an initial hung jury, there was international criticism
and pressure on the United States government. During the second trial, application of
judicial admission doctrine proved to be instrumental in the conviction of the defen-
dant. See generally A Fraud Among U.S. Agents, NEWSWEEK, August 13, 1984
(pointing out that the McKeon case was extremely political, involving shipping weap-
ons to alleged terrorists and suggesting that defense counsel may have improperly
used government secrets).
126. See supra note 55-57.
127. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
129. 365 U.S. 146 (1961).
130. Id.
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union representative.3 ' The district court ruled that a "trial memoran-
dum" filed by the government stating that the transaction at issue was a
"loan" constituted a judicial admission.'" The court thereby absolved
the defendant from any wrongdoing because the statute alleged to have
been violated did not cover loans."n The Supreme Court in Fruehauf,
however, refused to consider whether the "admission" had foreclosed the
government from proving at trial that the loan was a sham, or otherwise
constituted a transfer of something of value apart from an ordinary loan,
thus violating the statute."3 Although the Fruehauf court did not articu-
late a great deal of analysis before reaching its conclusion, it appears
that Fruehaufs conclusion is that an admission in a memorandum of law
should not be treated as a judicial admission.ln The Supreme Court has
yet to officially rule on the issue, but subsequently acknowledged that
Fruehauf did not squarely address whether statements in a memorandum
of law may be considered judicial admissions, and specifically noted that
the Fruehauf opinion has never been cited on the issue." Although the
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to rule on this specific issue, the
court has apparently chosen to allow the lower courts to dispute the
matter further.
Since the early prescriptions of Oscanyan and Jones, where the Su-
preme Court first bound litigants to the statements of their attorneys, the
law regarding the treatment of counsel's admissions in memoranda of
law has taken at least two divergent paths. The first federal case to ad-
dress counsels' admissions in memoranda of law was Young & Vann
Supply Co. v. Gulf F. & A. Ry. Co.'37 In Young, the plaintiff brought an
action against a railroad company, which purchased supplies from the
plaintiff while the railroad company was under the control of a receiv-
er.'" The railroad company successfully moved to dismiss the action
and the plaintiff appealed." The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the
plaintiff, as the railroad company's brief admitted that when the railroad
131. Id. at 147-48.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 148-49, 153.
134. Id. at 157-58.
135. See id.
136. United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 312, 316 n.4 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The lower court in Pruehauf dismissed the charges against the defendant based upon
a judicial admission in the government's memorandum of law. Id. at 316 n.4 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The appeal presented the question of whether a loan of money was
prohibited by the statute. Id. The lower court assumed the transaction was a "loan"
based upon the admission in the memorandum of law. Id. The binding affect of the
admission, therefore, was before the Supreme court, and should have been resolved.
137. 5 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1925).
138. Id. at 422.
139. Id
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company was sold, the creditors' committee acknowledged that the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover the amounts owed.'" The appellate court
followed Oscanyan, and concluded that it could consider statements in
briefs as judicial admissions."'
In Taylor v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., the court focused
on a different analysis and came to an entirely different conclusion than
the Young decision. In Taylor, the plaintiff sought to recover damages
resulting from an injury, contending that the trial court erred in refusing
to permit him to read into evidence admissions made by the defendant's
counsel in a pretrial memorandum." Despite the fact that the plaintiff
wished to have the admissions "read into evidence," which suggests that
plaintiff merely attempted to treat the admissions as evidentiary admis-
sions, the Taylor opinion addressed whether the admissions were judi-
cial admissions. The Taylor court, arguably in dictum, concluded that the
admissions were not judicial admissions as "they were not made on the
record during the course of the trial, and were not included in a
'pleading.'"' " The Taylor court also concluded that the admissions "did
not have sufficient formality or conclusiveness to be considered judicial
admissions."' Interestingly, the Taylor court did not cite or distinguish
the Young decision which is considered the seminal case on point. In
addition to not citing Young, the Taylor opinion did not address the
Supreme Court opinions in Jones and Oscanyan, which held that
counsels' statements could be treated as judicial admissions. Instead, the
Taylor court relied upon decisions which held that memoranda of law
and motions are not considered pleadings" and therefore not included
in the record. This is in conflict with the Supreme Court holding in
Oscanyan, which judicially bound a litigant to a statement that was not
in a pleading,47 and with the Fifth Circuit in Young, which bound a par-
140. Id. at 423 (sale was confirmed upon the express condition that some protec-
tion would be given to creditors by the creditor's committee as was given by the
receiver prior to the sale).
141. Id.
142. 320 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
143. Id. at 1384.
144. Id. at 1385 ("pleading" usually includes documents such as complaints, answers,
replies and other documents which frame the issues of the case).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1385; Rekeweg v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ind. 1961);
Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 15 (N.D. IlM. 1954); Wholesale Supply
Co., Inc. v. South Chester Tube Co., 20 F.R.D. 310 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
147. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 262 (1880).
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ty to a statement in a memorandum of law." Despite its apparent ana-
lytical shortcomings, the Taylor decision rather than the Young opinion
has been followed more frequently or had its reasoning applied by courts
addressing this issue. '4 In Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plas-
tics of Oklahoma, Inc., "o the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals followed
Taylor's analysis and attempted to reconcile Young by focusing on the
fact that the Young court treated the admission in question as a matter
of judicial discretion.'5'
The Plastic Container decision is troublesome because one of the
tenets of the judicial admission doctrine gives courts the discretion to
accept or reject judicial admissions at all times. The power to utilize this
discretion, therefore, should not be the basis for the wholesale rejection
of the application of the doctrine, to statements in memoranda of law. In
Jones and Oscanyan, the first two Supreme Court opinions to apply the
judicial admission doctrine, the Court specifically recognized that a trial
court has the discretion to accept or reject any party statements as judi-
cial admissions.2 Jones and Oscanyan set a strong precedent and led
to the consistent use of the doctrine regarding attorney statements in
pleadings and in open court." Thus, Taylor and its progeny are of
questionable analytical soundness as they do not comport with the analy-
sis used in these prior decisions.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS COURTS HAVE USED IN ADDRESSING
THE TREATMENT OF STATEMENTS IN MEMORANDA OF LAW
In the cases following Young and Taylor, federal courts have been
inconsistent in the application of the judicial admission doctrine regard-
ing memoranda of law, sometimes treating counsel's statements as judi-
cial admissions or evidentiary admissions, and other times refusing to
admit the statements altogether. Citing Taylor as the basis of the deci-
sion, however, federal courts in most instances have treated statements
in memoranda of law as evidentiary, not judicial admissions.
148. Young & Vann Supply Co., 5 F.2d 421, 423 (1925).
149. See, e.g., Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir.
1983); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885
(10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); Hub Floral Corp. v. Royal Brass
Corp., 454 F.2d 1226 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Lockert v. Faulkner,
574 F. Supp. 606, 609 (N.D. Inc. 1983). These decisions in turn have been accepted
by other federal circuit courts. See, e.g., American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp.,
861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988).
150. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980).
151. Plastic Container, 607 F.2d at 906.
152. Jones, 68 U.S. at 165; Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 263.
153. See supra notes 80-83 and 106-12 and accompanying text.
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Federal courts have focused on a variety of factors to justify treating
statements in memoranda of law as evidentiary admissions."u An analy-
sis of these cases demonstrates that the factors used by the courts are
questionable. For instance, courts appear to focus on the fact that
statements in memoranda of law are not part of the record and, thus, not
as conclusive as statements made in pleadings." Although memoranda
of law are not officially part of the record on appeal, appellate courts
have not had any difficulty reviewing such memoranda for statements
made by counsel in situations such as sanctioning counsel for legal posi-
tions taken."s Additionally, statements made in memoranda of law
should be viewed as equally deliberate, if not more deliberate, than
statements made in open court. Statements made in open court are often
spontaneous and not well thought out, yet are frequently deemed judicial
admissions." Therefore, it is only logical that statements in memoranda
of law, which have been written out and reviewed by counsel, should in
most cases have the same binding effect and also be considered judicial
admissions.
154. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank v. United States, 907 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1990) (judg-
ment notwithstanding a verdict context is different than a summary judgment con-
text); American Title, 861 F.2d at 227 (9th Cir. 1988) (non-declarant "did not intro-
duce the statement into evidence or object to the introduction of contradictory testi-
mony"); Loudermi//, 844 F.2d at 309 (6th Cir. 1988) (briefs prepared for oral argu-
ments are not pleadings); Plastic Container Corp., 607 F.2d at 906 ("[biriefs are not a
part of the record ... and the alleged admission appears to be contrary to the argu-
ment in its brief"); United States v. Belculfine, 527 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1975) (the
statement was a casual one, which was "made at a time when the party was urging
a legal theory under which the accuracy of the statement was irrelevant").
155. See supra note 146.
156. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir.
1986) (stating that Rule 11 applies to every paper signed during the course of the
proceedings and not only to the pleadings); Massive Paper Mills v. Two-Ten Corpo-
ration, 669 F.Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (opposition to motion for summary judgment
was frivolous and, thus, sanctionable); Long v. Quantex Resources, Inc., 108 F.R.D.
416, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sanctioning attorney who filed baseless jurisdictional mo-
tion); AM Int'l, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 433 (N.D.
M. 1984) (sanctioning counsel for filing of a brief containing a misleading footnote).
Some may argue that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 is the appropriate way
to handle factual misstatements. This argument fails for two reasons. First, unlike in
a Rule 11 setting, in a judicial admission scenario opposing counsel wants to use the
misstatement to prove his or her clients' case. Second, Rule 11 has often been criti-
cized for creating satellite litigation.
157. See supra notes 106-12.
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The lengths to which courts have gone in order to apply the doctrine
are demonstrated in an opinion where the court limited the circumstanc-
es under which it will treat "involuntary" acts as judicial admissions. The
court refused to hold counsel's statement as an admission partly because
"considerations of fairness and the policy of encouraging judicial admis-
sions require that trial judges be given broad discretion to relieve parties
from the consequences of judicial admission in appropriate cases. " "
Several questions arise from this proposition. First, if the policy is to
encourage judicial admissions, should judges be given broad discretion to
relieve parties from the consequences of those admissions? Second, the
doctrine of judicial admissions arose from involuntary acts of attor-
neys," and courts have subsequently held admissions to occur from
those involuntary acts in all aspects of a case."a Does this notion con-
flict with judicial discretion to relieve admissions? Finally, are statements
made in a memoranda of law and filed with the court really less formal
than statements made in open court? The cases thus far do not adequate-
ly resolve these questions.
Although courts have focused on the fact that statements in memoran-
da of law are not officially considered part of the record, certain federal
courts, in refusing to treat such statements as judicial admissions, have
considered other factors in determining whether to consider the state-
ments as judicial admissions.' These factors include:
(1) that the "alleged admission" appeared to be contrary to the argument in the
party's brief;
(2) that the opposing side never attempted to introduce the statement into
evidence,'" or objected to the introduction of contradictory testimony at trial;1 4
(3) that an "inadvertent" statement by counsel should not conclusively bind the
client;1 "
158. Beleuline, 527 F.2d at 944.
159. See, e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. at 263; Jones v. Morehead, 68 U.S. 155, 164-65
(1863); Childs v. Franco, 563 F. Supp. 290, 292 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
160. Best, 291 U.S. at 415; Belcuifine, 527 F.2d at 944.
161. Plastic Container Corp., 607 F.2d at 907; American Title, 861 F.2d at 226;
Belcufine, 527 F.2d at 944; In re Applin, 108 B.R. 253 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1989); Hub-
Floral Corp. v. Royal Brass Corp., 454 F.2d 1226 (2d Cir. 1972). But see United States
v. Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1959); In re Wilkes, 55 F.2d 224 (2d Cir.
1932); United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 285 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
rev'd, 404 F.2d 146 (1969); City Nat'l Bank, 907 F.2d at 539.
162. Plastic Container Corp., 607 F.2d at 907.
163. American Title, 861 F.2d at 227.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., In re Applin, 108 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1987) Hub-FRoral, 454
F.2d at 1226. But see Greenberg, 268 F.2d at 125; Leslie v. Knight Soda Fountain Co.,
55 F.2d 224 (2d Cir. 1932); A Motion Picture Film, 285 F. Supp. at 465.
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4) that a judgment notwithstanding the verdict context is unlike admissions of
fact in a summary judgment motion which are often treated as judicial admis-
sions; ' and
5) that "the statement was a casual one" and "was made when the party was
urging a legal theory under which the accuracy of the statement was irrele-
vant.1
6
A review of these factors raises questions about soundness of many of
these decisions. Looking at the first factor-that the statement was not
part of the record and the admission "appeared contrary" to the argu-
ment in the party's brieflY-raises the following question: If courts are
unforgiving when counsel makes statements in open court or in
pleadings, why should an attorney's professional standards be any less
when the factual assertion is in a brief? This concern is particularly sig-
nificant considering the backlog courts now face in hearing discovery
and other types of motions."
Some argue that judges should have a great amount of discretion to
avoid injustice to litigants. While this argument carries considerable
force, it ignores the fact that the doctrine of judicial admissions is often
applied to the detriment of litigants."' Courts should not use their dis-
cretion in a way which, in effect, precludes the application of the judicial
admission doctrine to statements in memoranda of law without explicitly
establishing that the doctrine does not apply thereto. There should be a
presumption that any such statement is considered a judicial admission
unless the court can articulate why it shouldn't be. The way courts cur-
rently handle this issue results in inconsistency and confusion by not
forcing attorneys to be more cautious and judicious in their written sub-
missions to the court. Although courts retain the discretion to prevent
injustices by avoiding labeling statements as judicial admissions, they
should not use their discretion as a shield to avoid critical analysis and
the creation of objective standards.
The second factor-the opposing side never attempted to introduce
the statement into evidence or objected to the introduction of contrary
evidence at trial-distinguishes admissions from "judicial admissions." It
is unnecessary for opposing counsel to use the admission as evidence
166. City National Bank, 907 F.2d at 539.
167. Belculfine, 527 F.2d at 944.
168. Plastic Container Corp., 607 F.2d at 407.
169. See July 5, 1994 New York Law Journal (Chief Judge Thomas Platt called to
study creating a fifth federal district in New York as a possible solution to caseload
problems in New York).
170. See supra notes 1-13 and accompanying text.
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because the judicial admission, by definition, removes the issue from the
case. While opposing counsel should be required to inform the court of a
judicial admission, this factor suggests that a "waiver" exception be ap-
plied to the doctrine. Such an exception undermines the purpose behind
judicial admissions.
The third factor-that the statement is inadvertent-like the first fac-
tor, advocates a weakening of the standards of professionalism.' As
discussed above, courts and scholars have specifically noted that inad-
vertent statements may constitute judicial admissions. 2 In addition,
when courts address admissions in pleadings, they place no emphasis on
whether the statement was purposeful or inadvertent. m There has yet
to be a detailed analysis addressing why attorneys' written representa-
tions in memoranda of law deserve less accountability than similar state-
ments made in a pleading.
The fifth factor-that the statement was a casual one and was made
when the facts were unimportant' 74-is an attempt by the court to be
pragmatic and recognize that counsel are at times called to quickly mar-
shall facts and respond to issues without reviewing the appropriate docu-
ments or consulting with their client and should not be penalized by
having those kind of statements deemed admissions. For instance, attor-
neys routinely respond to motions for temporary restraining orders or
make offers of proof in evidentiary disputes. In fact, the case discussing
this factor specifically noted that the alleged admission was in a brief
which was drafted over a weekend following the completion of a hearing
before a magistrate. 7 This factor is not inconsistent with the judicial
admission doctrine, and even if it is, it nevertheless should be a consider-
ation for a court when determining the treatment to be given to state-
ments in memoranda of law.
While one of the factors federal courts have used when addressing the
treatment of statements in memoranda of law merits further application,
171. See, e.g., Jones, 68 U.S. at 165.
An effort has been made by counsel to show that this admission has been
waived, by acts of plaintiffs, in going into the proofs, and otherwise treating
it as an open question .... It would be subversive of all sound practice,
and tend largely to defend the ends of justice, if the court should refuse to
accept a fact as settled, which is distinctly alleged in the bill, and admitted
in the answer.
Id.; see supra note 146 and accompanying text. The fourth factor-that a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict context is different from a summary judgment con-
text-merely begs the question.
172. See supra note 113-17 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text.
174. Belcufine, 527 F.2d at 944.
175. Id.
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the others do not. In addition to the difficulty in reconciling Young, fed-
eral courts failed to develop a single set of standards or factors when ad-
dressing the issue. Exacerbating the problem of analyzing statements
made in memoranda of law, courts confronted with this issue have
reached different conclusions, often with virtually no analysis."6 In
some circumstances the statements are treated as judicial admissions,'"
while in other circumstances, courts merely proclaim that the statements
are evidentiary admissions."8 Still in other cases, courts refuse to admit
the statements altogether." It is unfortunate that courts are able to de-
cide when a party should be punished, giving little or no guidance to the
bar, the judiciary, or litigants."n
176. See Lockert v. Faulkner, 574 F. Supp. 606, 609 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1983) (noting that
a memorandum created in support of a motion does not constitute a pleading for
purposes of a judicial admission); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304,
309 (6th Cir.) (reasoning that briefs written for oral argument do not constitute
pleadings); cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946 (1988); but see In re Southeast Banking Corp.,
855 F. Supp. 353, 357 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (noting that statement in brief that statute
of limitations precludes certain claims constituted a judicial admission); Dennis v.
Bradbury, 236 F. Supp. 683 (D. Colo. 1964) (reasoning that statement in plaintiff's
trial brief constituted judicial admission); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway, 557 F.2d 580,
595 n.13 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that facts stated in defendant's brief constituted judi-
cial admission even though the case is currently on appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1090 (1979).
177. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 130-31 (1st Cir. 1988) (reason-
ing that government's statements constituted admission under Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 801 (d)(2)(B) because the government had "manifested an adoption or belief in
its truth"); Advanced Medical Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., No. CIV.A 87-3059, 1989
WL 60424, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 1989) (holding that statements made by plaintiff
in memorandum of law constituted admissions by party-opponent under Evidence
Rule 801(d)(2)).
179. See Dartez v. Owens Illinois, Inc., 910 F.2d 1291, 1293-94 (5th Cir. 1990) (rea-
soning that post trial briefs filed by manufacturers in a separate declaratory judgment
action against their insurers, to establish liability coverage for potential claims, were
not party admissions over manufacturers' hearsay objection in subsequent personal
inactions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2301 (1992); Brownko Intern, Inc. v. Ogden Steel
Co., 585 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that statements contained in
briefs of counsel are not admissions by a party-opponent within the context of Rule
801).
180. Compare United States v. Ramirez, 894 F.2d 565, 570 (2d Cir. 1990) (reasoning
that failure to admit affidavit containing party-opponent admissions would not consti-
tute reversible error) with American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224,
226 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that admissions in a summary judgment motion are judi-
cial admissions).
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V. REASONS FOR CHANGE
Under the current law, courts have the discretion to achieve different
results under similar circumstances. In the Second Circuit alone, the
inconsistency in the treatment of incorrect statements in memoranda of
law typifies why more guidance should be given to practitioners and
courts. The most recent Second Circuit case to address the issue deter-
mined that statements in memorandum of law do not rise to the level of
a judicial admission."8 ' In Hub Floral Corp. v. Royal Brass Corp.," a
copyright infringement action, plaintiff, in a brief in support of a motion
for summary judgment, admitted that he had failed to properly register
the copyright." Defendants sought to use the admission to dismiss
plaintiffs action."M The Second Circuit followed the opinion in Taylor
v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., and refused to treat the statement as a
judicial admission because the statement was not in a pleading and not
part of the record.' The Hub Floral court repeatedly described the
statement as inadvertent8 7 as if to suggest that inadvertent statements
should not be judicially admitted.'"
In reaching this conclusion, the Hub Floral court did not mention
three prior opinions within the jurisdiction, two of which were from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit itself, which held
that factual statements in memoranda of law could be treated as judicial
admissions." Normally, the most recent case controls, but a fairly
strong argument can be made that in the Second Circuit the rule is un-
clear.
It is conceded that federal courts need discretion in handling their
cases in order for justice and equity to prevail. This discretion, however,
should not be used as a shield to avoid formulating standards and apply-
181. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text.
182. 454 F.2d 1226 (2d Cir. 1972).
183. Id. at 1228.
184. Id.
185. 320 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
186. Id. But see American Title Ins. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.
1988) (admissions in a summary judgment motion are judicial admissions).
187. Hub Floral, 454 F.2d at 1228-29.
188. Id. at 1228.
189. Leslie v. Knight Soda Fountain Co., 55 F.2d 224, 225 (2d Cir. 1932) (binding
court to appellant's evaluation in its brief of the item at issue and concluding "we
are entitled to take him at his word"); United States v. Greenberg, 268 F.2d 120, 127-
28 (2d Cir. 1959) (binding defendant to guilty plea entered in course of trial when
defendant was competently and fairly represented by experienced counsel); United
States v. Motion Picture Film, 285 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968) (reasoning that government statement in brief
that film had "social value" constituted judicial admission in a case where govern-
ment attempting to confiscate pornographic material).
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ing them consistently. Moreover, courts have been able to provide guid-
ance and set forth standards of professionalism when dealing with
counsels' factual statements in pleadings or in open court by establishing
guidelines for the bar and the judiciary to follow.'" The same should be
true for memoranda of law.
A. The Need for Greater Application of the Doctrine
This Article calls for greater application of the judicial admission doc-
trine to statements in memoranda of law, and a reconciling of the analy-
sis to be used when addressing counsels' admissions in these documents.
Greater use of the doctrine would allow for: (1) more guidance to the
bar;, (2) faster resolution of issues within a trial; (3) avoidance of the
appearance of non-judicial motivations being involved when the doctrine
is used;'' and (4) holding attorneys responsible for the consequences of
their actions, not excusing the attorney merely because of reconsidera-
tion of previous positions. Concern about the severity of results arising
from the greater use of judicial admissions is misplaced. Such concern
fails to take into account the reality that the doctrine is often applied,
and many times in situations much more "inadvertent" than memoranda
of law. Perhaps this concern is really addressing whether there should be
a doctrine of judicial admission at all, rather than in which situations it
should be applied. Furthermore, the argument raised in this Article calls
for greater and more consistent use of the doctrine, not the stripping of
a court's power to use its discretion to avoid injustices. Thus, courts
should not continue to use the doctrine indiscriminately without provid-
ing guidance to the bar. Courts should not use their power to decide
whether to apply the doctrine in a manner that usurps the need for well-
delineated standards. The doctrine is well-established, therefore, indis-
criminate use of the doctrine does more harm than a well-recognized and
uniform, albeit stringent, standard. As one writer stated in calling for the
doctrine's greater use:
Unlike unwary parties, attorneys are versed in courtroom procedure and the rules
governing judicial admissions. They should, therefore, be bound by statements
evincing less deliberation and not be permitted to escape preclusion by subse-
quent disclaimers of intent that frequently result from pressure by clients or re-
considered tactics."l
190. See supra notes 75 and 101 and accompanying text.
191. See United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984).
192. Note, Judicial Admissions, supra note 44, at 1132.
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B. The Need for Consistency and Standards for Treating Statements
in Memoranda of Law
In evaluating statements made in memoranda of law, courts have been
extremely inconsistent. Some courts hold such statements as judicial
admissions, others hold them as evidentiary admissions, and still others
do not recognize such statements as admissions of any kind.'" With
pleadings, if the statement is made in an unamended or superseded
pleading, courts have consistently held such statements as judicial adins-
sions. With statements made in open court, courts have developed an
analysis which states that if the statement is clear and unequivocal, then
that statement is typically considered a judicial admission.
If ambiguous on the other hand, statements in open court will not
usually bind the attorney and his client. As opposed to pleadings and
statements in open court, there is a lack of logical analysis regarding
statements in memoranda of law. While some courts emphasize that
statements made by counsel in memoranda of law are not pleadings or
part of the record, as mentioned previously, this adds little to the
analysis. The fact remains that statements in memoranda of law are often
more deliberate than the statements made by counsel in open court,
which are treated as judicial admissions. 4 Accordingly, treating
counsels' statements similarly would be more logical.
While it may seem harsh to, in effect, punish clients for counsel's mis-
takes in legal briefs, it is logical to do so and is consistent with the ad-
missions doctrine. Courts already treat counsels' statements as admis-
sions in some instances, such as statements in pleadings. Nonetheless
courts may be reluctant to expand the admissions doctrine for fear of
stifling creative and zealous advocacy.'99 While the judiciary may be re-
luctant to interfere with fellow lawyers' tactics, sympathy for the pres-
sures and difficulties of advocacy provides an unpersuasive rationale for
the sporadic and inconsistent application of the admissions doctrine. The
doctrine must be applied uniformly, and the bar must have clear guide-
lines for its use. Moreover, the court as well as counsel will benefit from
193. See supra notes 126-53 and accompanying text; see also In re Southeast Bank-
ing Corp., 855 F.Supp. 353, 357 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1994); City of Philadelphia v. Public
Employees Ben. Servs. Corp., 842 F. Supp. 827, 830-31 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (refusing to
take judicial notice of statements made in a memorandum when the statements were
off the record and not contained in the pleading).
194. See Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Educ., 844 F.2d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1988);
Lockert v. Faulkner, 574 F. Supp. 606, 609 (N.D. Inc. 1983).
195. An argument for leniency when dealing with memoranda of law is that state-
ments in pleadings can be amended. However, statements in open court typically
cannot be retracted and are binding. In addition, there are restrictions on amending
pleadings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
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this clarification. If assertions in legal memoranda constitute judicial
admissions, lawyers will not be tempted to offer the court arguments
that could be construed as admissions. Thus, judicial efficiency will be
enhanced by expanding the doctrine. Generally, Oscanyan196 and
Young,"7 which allow courts to construe clear and unambiguous
statements in briefs as admissions, illustrate the direction the law should
take in this area. However, this Article does not espouse eliminating the
court's discretion to recognize judicial admissions. Courts must retain the
power to reject judicial admissions when doing so furthers justice. This
writer proposes that courts should follow Oscanyan" Jones," and
Young,'s and treat clear and unambiguous statements in memoranda of
law as judicial admissions.
VI. GUIDANCE
To provide a consistent standard for applying the admissions doctrine,
courts must provide the bar with clear guidelines. This article proposes
that courts treat factual statements"1 in legal memoranda similar to
statements in open court. Generally, a casual response to a query by the
court is too uncertain to constitute a judicial admission. 2 Similarly, a
196. 103 U.S. 261 (1880).
197. 5 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1925).
198. 103 U.S. 261 (1880).
199. 63 U.S. 155 (1863).
200. 5 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1925).
201. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Waller, 323 F.2d 20, 24 (4th Cir. 1963) (to be
a judicial admission, the statement must relate to a factual matter, not legal theory of
the case), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964).
202. Howard Indus., Inc. v. Rae Motor Corp., 186 F. Supp. 469, 471 (E.D. Wis.
1960), affd, 293 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1961) (a casual response to a query from the
court is not a judicial admission); Rhoades, Inc. v. United Air Lines Inc., 340 F.2d
481, 484 (3d Cir. 1965) (an ambiguous statement in opening remarks is not an admis-
sion); Harrison Constr. Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Conun'n, 316 F.2d 174, 177 (6th Cir.
1963) (portion of opening statement was not an admission because it was "clearly
inconsistent with the [client's] pleadings, evidence and closing argument" and "it oc-
curred to no one at the trial that the remarks in questions constituted an admis-
sion"); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 542 (2d Cir.
1965) (Even though counsel "virtually conceded that (the] burden of proof ... had
not been met," the statement "did not have sufficient formality or conclusiveness to
be a judicial admission."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Sefton v. Valley Dairy
Co., 28 A.2d 313, 314 (Pa. 1942) (an ambiguous statement "made in an unsuccessful
attempt to prevent introduction of additional evidence" does not "rise to the dignity
of an admission or stipulation").
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minor typographic error in a brief would not provide the basis for a judi-
cial admission, particularly if the error contradicts the rest of the docu-
ment.' In addition, if the factual statement in the brief seems inconse-
quential and unrelated to the legal argument, the court may use its dis-
cretion to deny the statement status as an admission.' Thus, a state-
ment would not be a judicial admission when the statement is casual,
inconsistent with the rest of the brief, a minor typographic error, or irrel-
evant to the legal argument.
The general standard for judicial admissions in briefs should be that
facts must be stated clearly and must pertain to a legal conclusion.ss
The clarity of the statement may be determined by the iterations in the
brief." Thus, under the proposal recommended here, repeating a clear,
unambiguous statement that provides the basis for a legal conclusion
requires the court to find that the statement constitutes a judicial admis-
sion.
Attorneys must be more accountable for their assertions. In recent
years society has become more litigious, and the resulting lawsuits have
become more complicated and protracted. Attorneys must be held re-
sponsible for misstatements of fact that keep alive a meritless claim or
defense."? It is unjust to allow an attorney to prevail on a motion that
furthers or defeats an action and then claim different facts at trial.
Courts should hold attorneys and clients to the prescriptions of
Oscanyan, and bind an attorney to his words when he or she makes a
clear and unambiguous factual statement. Further, courts should not dis-
tinguish between statements of record and memoranda of law as this
distinction does not justify treating one as a judicial admission and not
the other. Indeed, Professors Wigmore and Chadbourne argue that:
The doctrine of Judicial Admissions has long had a large future before it, if judges
would but use it adequately. In the first place, the judge could apply it to all in-
formal, as well as formal, admissions by counsel during trial .... It is easy to see
how large a mass of needless skirmishing can thereby be eliminated, how much
time would be saved, and how much confusion of the jury would be avoided. And
this would be attained by the mere application of an existing principle.=
203. Cf. Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 805,
907 (19th Cir. 1979) (statement was "contrary to the argument in [the] brief").
204. See, e.g., United States v. Belculfine, 527 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir. 1975) (a bind-
ing admission must not follow from an "involuntary" act and courts must have dis-
cretion to "relieve parties from the consequences of judicial admission" for casual
statements).
205. Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263 (1880) (counsel's statement was un-
ambiguous); Best v. District of Columbia, 291 U.S. 411, 415 (1934) (directing a verdict
after opening statement is not proper if statement is ambiguous).
206. See, e.g., Oscanyan, 103 U.S. 261, 264 (counsel "dwelt upon and reiterated the
statement").
207. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
208. 9 WIGMORE, supra note 25, § 2597 at 851-52. Statements should be deliberate
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Holding counsel accountable for admissions in memoranda of law
would not be an undue burden on courts. Currently, courts hold counsel
accountable for statements made in documents that are not part of the
record.' Further, the law holds attorneys accountable for their repre-
sentations in other contexts."' For example, courts may discipline an
attorney who files a document that has no basis in law or fact. " '
VII. CONCLUSION
The judicial admission doctrine has been a valuable tool for courts to
ensure a minimum of accountability by counsel. Under this doctrine,
counsel are held to their factual representations and, to some extent,
overzealous advocacy is kept in check. However, the doctrine needs to
be reformed because its parameters are not clearly defined and some
attorneys seek a tactical advantage by misleading the opposing party and
the court in legal briefs. Further, expanding the use of the admissions
doctrine to include statements in memoranda of law would have a posi-
tive impact on the legal profession as a whole. An overburdened judicia-
ry would benefit from broadening the doctrine since this would encour-
age the expeditious resolution of matters before the courts. Most impor-
tantlg, reforming the admissions doctrine would resolve the current in-
consistencies in this area that have perplexed diligent attorneys and
jeopardized the efficiency of the courts.
to be judicial admissions. For instance, statements in letters written to the court
should remain evidentiary admissions. Letters are not part of the record and may be
written hastily and in the heat of a dispute. Further, a succession of attorneys may
be involved in an action, so it may be unfair to hold clients and counsel to the
statements of an attorney who is no longer working on the case. For these reasons,
letters should not be binding admissions.
209. See supra Part I.; qf. FED. R. CiV. P. 11 (providing for sanctions involving
"pleadings, motions, and other papers").
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V. 1994); FED. R. Civ. P. 11; McCoRMICK,
supra note 14, § 254, at 447-49.
211. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988 & Supp. V. 1994); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447
U.S. 752 (1980) (discussing sanctions under § 1927).
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